Israel and the Flotilla

At this point, two days after the Israeli Navy's assault on the Turkish ferry and the other vessels attempting to head to Gaza, we all recognize that the Netanyahu government is in damage control mode. Whether the assault in international waters was justified or not is no longer the point. At a minimum, it was mishandled.

Even Israeli military officials are now saying their intelligence was faulty. However, other Israeli commentators speak of the government's "self-righteousness", its "fear", even its stupidity. Both Israeli and international commentators lament the public relations trap that Israel willingly entered into, giving the "activists" all the victimhood they really sought, while further tarnishing Israel's international reputation.

It is easy for Israelis and Israel's supporters to hide behind the claim that the ships had terrorists aboard. However, it's beside the point. The presence of terrorists, even the head of the IHH, sponsor of the operation, was part of the goad to get Israel to overreact. The point is that managing provocations such as this has been part and parcel of Israel's survival for more than six decades.  What has happened to that skill?

At this point, two perspectives are needed. One is to look back on this operation in the form of an inquiry for the government and military to assess how to balance their security and international public relations needs. In the past, Israel was a master at this art. Now, it is the Palestinians, particularly Hamas and Hezbollah, that direct this orchestra.

The second is to look forward to repair the damage done to the country's reputation. Israel's leaders need to visit all its friends rapidly with a message that is not based on insecurity and truculence (the responses I've read so far, even from Shimon Peres, President of Israel and Nobel Peace Prize winner). Friends seem few and far between. Some transparency and detail would help too - why the government felt the assault on the ships was necessary in international waters, what it suspected it ships were carrying and why it had these suspicions. Because so far, the photos from Ashdod of wheelchairs and teddy bears among the cargo being released for shipment to Gaza are not very convincing that an immediate threat existed that demanded this type of commando operation.

Particularly, the value of the Gaza blockade should be assessed to see if this rigid measure is really restraining the importation of rockets (its supposed aim) into the territory. Operation Cast Lead existed to respond to the attacks by rockets stocked by Hamas and its allies while the blockade existed. While it was a "disproportionate" (a word used primarily by Israel's critics) response to the rockets, it effectively stopped them and has brought a much higher degree of calm to south central Israel.

Could Israel not achieve the same results through ship contraband inspections within Israel's maritime zone? With such a relaxation of the blockade, Egypt would not be as tempted as it must currently be to let the smuggling tunnels (the major source of entrance for weapons into Gaza) expand their activities. As well, it would represent a response to this morning's opening from Turkey to restore its positive relationship with Israel and perhaps offer a compromise that would put this episode, which everyone, everywhere, finds lamentable.

As a confirmed Israel supporter and Zionist, I am troubled. We need more friends and supporters internationally to pursue the goals that are really necessary for the long-term survival of the State of Israel.